Commentary

Living In The Dark Side Of Sunny Mexico

By Carlos Luken (Dec 12, 2008)

To say, "Mexican crime and violence has gotten out of hand" is an understatement if not on oxymoron. Murders, kidnappings, decapitations, gun battles have become part of the daily routine and unfailingly plaster Mexican front pages and the broadcast news.

Terrified mothers begin their day praying that husbands get to work unharmed, and that children will get to school safely without being subject to kidnapping attempts or hoping that their families will not be harmed in day by day gunfights that now erupt indiscriminately near workplaces, shopping centers, schools or homes.

Children are now forbidden to leave their homes to play in parks or in their front yards, young adults risk their lives when going out at night to their favorite bars (Where many massacres have occurred), adults drive guardedly avoiding any traffic altercation or alienating other drivers with the fear of creating arguments that may be a pretense to hijackings, kidnappings, or worse murder.

Even daily activities like shopping or going to the bank embrace serious risks.

In a foolish attempt to deny the obvious, some Mexican Authorities refuse to acknowledge what most Mexicans endure daily: a sense of living in fear, powerless to lead normal lives because of a lack of protection. As this form of community survival continues daily, local officials have tried to downplay the existing bedlam by providing cosmetic statistics to cover up their incompetence to provide what the population now considers by far, as Mexico's gravest problem and concern. their safety.

In brainless attempts to disguise the climate of terror, Mexican crime rate statistics are compared to those in other U.S. and world cities. It is not uncommon to read or hear official statements comparing the number of deaths, car jacking and kidnappings with New York, Chicago, Oakland, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Diego and even Baghdad.

While other world cities violent crime rates may be higher; there is one consistent and undisclosed statistic which distinguishes Mexico and sets it apart from any comparison to others. The percentage of police officials involved in crimes in Mexico reaches pandemic proportions of 60 to 80%.

It stands to reason that Mexico's main problems are corruption and impunity.

It's alleged that in the past, drug cartel "arrangements" with authorities were usual; for a given price a "safe territory" was recognized and given to criminals provided that their operations were handled "discreetly" and that violence or other criminal activities were held in check. This "Franchise system" worked for many years; crime activities were synchronized and limited; large amounts of money trickled in to dishonest officials and found its way into Mexico's political system.

There were some exceptions, but not many.

The "franchise system" finally caved because of greed, whereas some drug cartels were making too much money in their territories, others weren't so fortunate. Northern drug lords smuggled massive amounts of narcotics to their US counterparts (Who had established a US franchise systems of their own). As business boomed they became richer and voracious. Feeling more powerful, they began to challenge the system by eyeing other territories and renegotiating existing deals. As they "muscled in" to other franchises, most coordination with authorities was disregarded and territorial wars started.

When the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its seven decade prominence all bets were suddenly off; competing cartels made bolder infringement moves on others in the hope of having a larger piece of the action and waited for expected turnover in which the new government would renegotiate and establish new rules.

But the incoming National Action Party (PAN) recognized that existing corruption was the main reason PRI was unexpectedly ousted from power by Mexican voters and refused to make the same mistake, PAN rejected preserving or continuing the established "franchise system". Although some State governors tried to maintain their agreements, using their state and municipal police protection. It soon became clear that without federal sanction synchronization would fail.

This led to uncontainable cartel activities. Large organizations invested their massive funds and modernized weaponry (Smuggled from the US), increased their manpower (Recruiting heavily Federal, State and Army renegades), they improved their intelligence infrastructure and poured millions on infiltrating police forces subsequently they began a battle to annihilate or consolidate smaller rival gangs.

President Felipe Calderon has taken bold and determined steps to curb bribery and drug violence; by first acknowledging that police involvement and corruption was widespread and purged almost half of the country's police forces and invested heavily in training, salaries and benefits for the new policemen, in the meantime he deputized the Mexican Army into taking an active role in crime fighting.

Recognizing citizen discontent and concern he has also presented legislative reforms to harden laws (Joining congress' efforts for instituting the dearth penalty in extreme cases of kidnappings) and strived to improve Mexico's Judicial Branch.

Still with all of Calderon's reforms and initiatives, the Mexican cartels and their Latin American and US cohorts will not give up without increasing their all out war against the Mexican government. Many fear that in an effort to pressure Calderon this could lead to escalating into narco-terrorist activities against civilians. President Calderon has been forthright in his determination and has publicly resolved that he will not only continue but win the war against the cartels (Some analysts have suggested the institution of a national guard in the style of Spain or Italy).

Implementing these measures takes time, Mexico will possibly continue to live under violence, but this might be the only price to pay to rid Mexico from violence.

The question on many minds is "When will the United States accept its responsibility as the prime drug market and do its part?"

Carlos Luken is an independent columnist.